Policy · Analysis
The Ninth Circuit Read Kalshi's Marketing Back to It
A published opinion says sports event contracts are sports bets no matter what a federally regulated exchange calls them. Read the actual document, though, and three things the headlines missed turn up — including the part the panel deliberately did not decide.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled on Friday that Nevada may enforce its gaming laws against Kalshi, the federally designated contract market that lists sports event contracts. The panel held that those contracts are not "swaps" under the Commodity Exchange Act — and if they are not swaps, the federal statute Kalshi has leaned on for two years does not shield it from state gambling regulators.
That much made every headline. The opinion runs 50 pages, and it is worth reading, because at least three of its load-bearing details did not survive the trip into the coverage.
The sentence that decided it
Judge Ryan D. Nelson, writing for a panel that also included Judges Bridget S. Bade and Kenneth K. Lee, spends much of the opinion on the definition of "swap" in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii) — an agreement whose payment depends on "an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence." Kalshi's position was that a football game is an event, and that the money riding on it is the financial consequence. Read those words at their broadest, and the argument works.
The panel declined to read them at their broadest. Doing so, Nelson wrote, "would render the definition of swap so broad as to be meaningless." The court reached instead for context — and found the most damaging context in Kalshi's own materials. "Kalshi has a gambling problem," the opinion says, because the company "describes and markets its sports event contracts offered on its DCM as 'legal sports betting.'" A few pages later: "The substance of the sports event contracts offered on Kalshi's DCM is sports gambling, regardless of whether Kalshi calls them swaps."
The panel was equally direct about the stakes of the alternative. Congress, Nelson wrote, "did not take a wrecking ball to all sports gambling regulations built up over decades by federal, state, and tribal governments" when it amended the Commodity Exchange Act through Dodd-Frank. Courts do not assume Congress hid a repeal of the nation's gambling law inside a Wall Street reform bill.
Three things the coverage got wrong or left out
First, the disposition. Most reports described a clean 3-0 affirmance. The opinion's final line reads: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART. The panel affirmed the dissolution of Kalshi's preliminary injunction as to sports event contracts, and sent the case back so the district court can consider Nevada's challenges to Kalshi's election contracts — a separate and unresolved question that the sports-betting analysis does not automatically answer.
Second, the split is narrower than "two circuits disagree" implies. On field preemption, the Ninth Circuit expressly agreed with the Third Circuit's decision in KalshiEX, LLC v. Flaherty, 172 F.4th 220 (3d Cir. 2026), that the Commodity Exchange Act is a comprehensive scheme that preempts state regulation of futures trading. The circuits diverge on one question only: whether a sports event contract falls inside the swap definition in the first place. Everything else follows from that.
Third, and least covered: the concurrence.
Where the two circuits actually part company
| Question | Ninth Circuit (Assad) | Third Circuit (Flaherty) |
|---|---|---|
| Is the CEA a comprehensive scheme? | Yes | Yes |
| Does it preempt state rules on swaps traded on a DCM? | Yes | Yes |
| Is a sports event contract a "swap"? | No — it is a bet | Yes |
| Result for the state regulator | Nevada may enforce | New Jersey enjoined |
Judge Lee's footnote-sized time bomb
Lee concurred, agreeing with the textual analysis, but flagged something that ought to worry both sides. The court's reasoning leans on the CEA's Special Rule, which lets the CFTC find that contracts involving "gaming" are contrary to the public interest, and on the regulation implementing it — 17 C.F.R. § 40.11, which categorically prohibits such contracts.
Lee's point is that the statute "appears to give the CFTC discretion whether to ban gaming contracts altogether," meaning it may not categorically bar them at all. He set the question aside because § 40.11 "currently bars gaming contracts." Read that word again: currently. Section 40.11 is an agency regulation, not a statute. A future CFTC could amend or repeal it through notice-and-comment rulemaking, without Congress lifting a finger — and one of the pillars this ruling rests on would be gone.
Where this goes
Upward, almost certainly. New Jersey has until September 3 to petition the Supreme Court in the Third Circuit case, per InGame, and a genuine circuit split on a federal preemption question is close to the platonic ideal of a cert grant. The opinion itself notes a pending Fourth Circuit appeal in KalshiEX LLC v. Martin, No. 25-1892, plus district court decisions "with varied results" — including one that went Kalshi's way in Tennessee in February.
The lawyer list is its own signal. Kalshi argued through Milbank, with Neal Katyal on the brief. Nevada argued through Nicole Saharsky of Mayer Brown. These are not the attorneys you retain for a preliminary-injunction skirmish in Las Vegas; they are the ones you retain when you expect to be standing at a lectern in Washington.
For crypto readers the relevance is structural rather than immediate. Kalshi is a CFTC-designated contract market — the most regulated end of the prediction-market business, and the one whose federal license was supposed to be the strongest possible defense. The Ninth Circuit just held that the license does not settle what the product is. Any venue that lists outcome contracts, onchain or off, is now on notice that a court may look past the wrapper to the substance, and that "we are federally regulated" is an answer to a different question than "is this gambling in your state."
The Take
Two takeaways. One: this opinion is a case study in why a product's marketing copy is a legal document. Kalshi's own advertising — "legal sports betting" — is quoted back at it as evidence of what the contracts really are, and it is hard to read the opinion without concluding that line cost the company the appeal. Two: notice how much of the ruling hangs on § 40.11, a regulation an agency can rewrite. Everyone is watching the Supreme Court, and the faster lever is an unglamorous rulemaking docket at the CFTC. Watch that docket. And read the opinion — it is public, it is free, and it says something meaningfully different from the summary of it.